This is a short online discussion paper for those thinking of attending this session at Rights Con Continues.
The page provides a little more detail on the content expected to be discussed. If you want to give advance notice of a contribution you wish to make in the session, email [email protected]. We can make sure to turn to you during the session and if you wish we can include a note about your topic in this public page.
Please note, in the spirit of the Rights Con Code of Conduct and to ensure open discussion, nothing said in the roundtable itself will be referred to here. Only those contributions emailed separately will be included below.
If you are not current signed up for Rights Con Continues, you can find out more and register here.
The core theme
The overall goal of the session is to focus on the topic of legal remedies in for individuals affected by transnational repression (TNR). Cross-border law enforcement cooperation is necessary for the effective investigation and prosecution of crime and the protection of the public. However, these same tools can, and have been, misused as tools of TNR to silence activists, journalists and opponents in exile. The key question then becomes: is there a proper system available for the affected individual to seek justice - or is there a 'legal vacuum' where rights cannot be enforced?
We seek reflections from YOU, in a broad and inclusive discussion.
What is your experience of TNR and seeking accountability?
Is TNR via cooperation happening in your region, or targeting your community, and what do remedies look like?
Can you speak to other systems in the TNR umbrella, and is there enough legal protection built in?
Are you a victim of TNR and what was it like seeking justice?
What initiatives could we pursue together to take this discussion forward?
Would you be interested in helping to develop an advocacy paper on this between now and RC27?
Expected examples / areas of discussion
Remedies in the INTERPOL context - Introduced by Alex Tinsley (Doughty Street) - The classic introduction to this topic is INTERPOL. Its 'wanted person' notices and diffusions serve an important purpose but have been misused to silence activists, placing them at risk of arrest and limiting their movement. What is the position in terms of remedies? INTERPOL is generally not subject to national courts' jurisdiction. Individuals instead have access to a remedial mechanism within INTERPOL (the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF)). Some years ago, this entity was not a meaningful system of justice: delays, no binding powers, no written decisions, members not qualified to deal with the issues arising. Since 2016, it has been significantly reformed and now operates closer to a quasi-judicial mechanism. However, there are lasting concerns about it: there is adversarial procedure, and there are epic delays which leave people in uncertainty and suffering impact of alerts for years while they seek to assert their claims. In summary: not a legal vacuum as such, but a system of remedies that lacks effectiveness. For further reading, see this European Criminal Bar Association paper focused on current issues with the CCF.
The Arab Interior Ministers' Council - Introduced by Tanya Boulakovski (MENA Rights) - The AIMC has been described as the Arab INTERPOL. It is a specialised security body of the League of Arab States. A state can circulate an arrest warrant regionally via the AIMC. Its General Secretariat is reported to hold a database containing information on individuals wanted for alleged criminal activities. This system has been used in a string of problematic cases involving peaceful dissidents who have, via the AIMC, been exposed to a risk of torture and enforced disappearance. There appears to be no system (akin to the CCF in the INTERPOL system) for individuals to challenge the circulation of AIMC arrest warrants against them. So there is a legal vacuum here. The topic is broader, however. At base, the risk of abuse of AIMC tools originates in the practices at national level including excessively broad and open provisions of criminal law which are routinely used to capture political expression and other protected acts. For further reading, see this MENA Rights backgrounder on the AIMC.
International law out of reach: cooperation in the Mekong region - There is a serious problem of transnational repression in the Mekong subregion of South East Asia. See the Human Rights Watch report 'We thought we were safe'. A key site is Thailand, a regional cooperation hub. There are serious gaps in legal protection, illustrated by recent cases. Truong Duy Nhat, a blogger, was disappeared off the streets of Bangkok and reappeared in Vietnamese prison without any sort of judicial process at all (the UN Working Group found both countries responsible for arbitrary detention). More recently Y Quynh Bdap (a religious and minority ethnic rights activist from Vietnam) convicted in his absence in Vietnam, was subject to controversial extradition proceedings in which the Thai courts ordered extradition, despite universal warnings about a risk of torture and enforced disappearance. Notably, the extradition Thai law does not provide grounds to resist extradition requests based on convictions in absentia, leaving a core part of fair trial rights protection out of reach. A new ASEAN extradition treaty may potentially lead to new practices in the region.
Mutual legal assistance and the UN Convention on Cybercrime - Introduced by Kate Robertson (Citizen Lab) - The proposal and eventual adoption of the UNCC was met with skepticism and alarm in civil society. It requires states to possess an arsenal of powers to access and collect people's electronic data. And it puts in place a framework for states to require others to carry out such acts and/or to share data so obtained across borders. Against the backdrop of known abuses such as Pegasus spyware, there is a real concern that such a system could be misused, including for TNR. Yet the legal safeguards in the UNCC are general and vague and leave much to national legal systems. So, it will depend on national law whether a person is ever informed of e.g. surveillance carried out in their regard, and what rights of challenge they may have in either of the states involved. This could potentially mean significant abuses may go undeclared, unchallenged and uncompensated. See the joint civil society letter on the signing of the UNCC.
Mutual legal assistance and data exchange - Contribution from Chryssa Mela (Fair Trials) - In recent years Europe has seen the emergence of a new model in law enforcement cooperation. One state uses advanced intrusion capabilities to access the communications of an entire user base of an encrypted system, on the basis that it is being used for criminal purposes. It then makes the data available to other states via MLA or EU legal instruments. The importing states then rely on this for criminal trials - successfully prosecuting hundreds of cases of serious criminality. Examples of this include EncroChat, Sky ECC and the FBI-authored ANOM system used in Operation Trojan Shield. These are all genuine law enforcement initiatives in good faith, which European courts have mostly approved, but there have been real human rights questions arising. These include the basic question of where a person is supposed to exercise remedies when (i) they have no standing in the country that did the data collection but (ii) the state where the data is used considers itself unable to review the lawfulness of that data collection in another state, because of principles of mutual trust. These matters highlight just how difficult it can be to ensure rights protection in cross-border environments. If one added in the idea of a state acting for an ulterior purpose, that becomes truly dangerous.
Terrorism listings: a national legal tool with cross-border impact, remedies out of reach - Contribution from Coskun Yorulmaz (The Arrested Lawyers' Initiative) - It has been well documented that Türkiye has, since the coup attempt of 2016, deployed anti-terrorism legislation and tools in excessively broad manner to target alleged members of the Gülen movement. It is equally well-known that it has sought to extend that internationally via INTERPOL, even writing a manual on how to circumvent INTERPOL's checks. Less well known is the use of terrorism designations. These listings appear on government websites and produce impact globally. For example, financial diligence tools like World Check pick up on them, leading to account closures and refusal of credit to those operating abroad. It is highly difficult accessing justice: nothing can realistically be done in Türkiye, and organisations like World Check are unlikely to remove adverse content from their profiling so long as it exists (however strongly challengeable) as a domestic listing. This is a legal vacuum.
Have your say!
If you have something you'd like to bring to other participants' attention, send me an email at [email protected] and we can include it here and/or factor it into our plans for chairing the session.
Last updated: 15 Sept 2026